

Message Text

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ERDA:IWILLIAMS

NSC:DELLIOTT

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NEA:ADUBS

ACDA/NWT:FMARTIN

CIA:DBRASTED

NSC:SHADLEY

NEA/INS:BBROWN

EUR/CAN:DKRUSE

S/S:FVORTIZ

PM/NPO:LNSENZO

OES:HBENGELSDORF INR/STA:LFINCH

IO:LCAVANAUGH OSD/ISA:GHARLOW

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY

S E C R E T STATE 194505

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, TECH, IN

SUBJECT: INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY

REFS: (A) NEW DELHI 10311 (BOMBAY 1907); (B) STATE

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172122 NOTAL; (C) IAEA VIENNA 6838

1. APPRECIATE REPORT REF A OF SETHNA'S FURTHER COMMENTS ON QUESTION OF INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPORT ISSUE. AS INDICATED REF B, US CONTINUES TO HAVE STRONG INTEREST IN GOI RESTRAINT ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS, PARTICULARLY SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY.
2. WHILE INDIAN CAPABILITIES IN NEAR FUTURE FOR COMMERCIALLY VIABLE EXPORTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE LIMITED, SETHNA'S INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE GOI POLICY REVIEW IN NEXT THIRTY DAYS UNDERLINES DESIRABILITY OF CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON SENSITIVE NUCLEAR EXPORT ISSUES.
3. MISSION SHOULD CONTINUE TO DRAW AS APPROPRIATE AND IN LOW KEY MANNER ON GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF B AND PREVIOUS, TO INDICATE TO GOI IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY. DEPARTMENT CONCERNED THAT BEHIND SETHNA'S REMARKS (PARAS 9 AND 10 REF A) IS APPARENT ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE US AND CANADA ON RESOLUTION OF INDIA EXPORT CONTROL AND SAFEGUARDS ISSUES BY THREATENING TO REVERSE GOI'S CURRENT POLICY OF NOT EXPORTING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. ON THIS POINT, BANE SHOULD CLARIFY TO SETHNA THAT US NUCLEAR SUPPLY POLICY IS NOT RPT NOT TO INHIBIT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION BUT TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE IAEA SAFEGUARDS ARE APPLIED ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND THAT SPECIAL RESTRAINT IS EXERCISED IN SUPPLY OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SUCH AS REPROCESSING FACILITIES. BANE SHOULD EXPRESS OUR HOPE THAT THE GOI WOULD CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY SUCH POLICY GUIDELINES. FINALLY, IN LIGHT OF REF A PARAS 2 AND 4, AND OF REF C WE WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF INDIAN/IAEA ARRANGEMENTS FOR MONITORING AT TARAPUR.
4. WE NOTE WITH INTEREST SETHNA'S STATEMENT THAT GOI REVIEW MIGHT LEAD TO DECISION TO EXPORT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY ONLY TO NPT PARTIES. IN LIGHT OF GOI'S HIGHLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE TOWARD TREATY, AT FIRST GLANCE THIS POSITION APPEARS ANOMALOUS. WHILE WE REALIZE THAT OUR THOUGHTS ARE SPECULATIVE, SEVERAL REASONS COULD BE ADVANCED TO EXPLAIN SETHNA'S COMMENT. THE FIRST IS THAT THE INDIANS
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MAY HOPE, BY LIMITING SALES TO NPT COUNTRIES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE A "RESPONSIBLE" EXPORTER. SECOND, INDIANS MAY BE CONSIDERING POSSIBLE SALES EFFORT TO IRAN, WHICH IS NPT COUNTRY. FINALLY, GOI MAY PREFER TO RELY ON NPT-RELATED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS WHICH BAR ALL FORMS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES, CONSISTENT WITH A RECIPIENT'S NPT OBLIGATIONS. INDIA MIGHT FIND THE ALTERNATIVE OF STANDARD IAEA SAFEGUARDS OUTSIDE NPT CONTEXT UNACCEPTABLE. THESE

LATER SAFEGUARDS DO NOT RPT NOT EXPLICITLY RPT EXPLICITLY PRECLUDE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, THOUGH USG HAS CONSISTENTLY INTERPRETED THEM AS PRECLUSIVE. THIS LACK OF PRECISION MIGHT THUS RAISE FOR INDIA THE DILEMMA OF EITHER HAVING TO REQUIRE EXPLICIT NON-PNE ASSURANCE FROM RECIPIENT COUNTRY, OR ELSE RISKING POTENTIAL INDIAN CONTRIBUTION TO SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITIES. IN BANE'S NEXT DISCUSSION WITH SETHNA, HE SHOULD STEER CONVERSATION IN DIRECTIONS LIKELY TO ELICIT EXPLANATION OF CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING NUCLEAR EXPORTS ONLY TO NPT PARTIES, WITHOUT, HOWEVER, APPEARING TO EXPRESS EXCESSIVE INTEREST.

5. RE REF A PARA 7, MOST APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL IN ERDA FOR SETHNA TO CONTACT WOULD BE NELSON SIEVERING, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS AND PROGRAMS.

6. FOR IAEA VIENNA; IN LIGHT OF REF A, PARAS 2 AND 4, AND REF C, THERE IS APPARENT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GOI AND IAEA CONCERNING INSTALLATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT AT TARAPUR. WE WOULD APPRECIATE MISSION COMMENTS ON HOW MISUNDERSTANDING COULD BE CLEARED UP, AND BETTER COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN IAEA AND GOI ESTABLISHED. BEARING IN MIND DESIRABILITY OF DIRECT INDIAN/IAEA DISCUSSIONS ON THIS MATTER, WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INDICATION OF WHO MAY BE REPRESENTING INDIA AT IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE MEETING (SEE PARA 5, REF A) OR WHEN NEXT VISIT FROM IAEA TO INDIA MIGHT TAKE PLACE.

7. FOR OTTAWA: EMBASSY'S COMMENTS ON PARAS 9, 10, AND 11 OF REF A (BEING REPEATED SEPTTEL) WOULD BE APPRECIATED,
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PARTICULARLY ANY INFORMATION YOU MIGHT HAVE CONCERNING INDIAN WILLINGNESS TO MAKE "UNILATERAL DECLARATION" MENTIONED PARA 9. IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH CANADIAN OFFICIALS, YOU SHOULD ELICIT CANADIAN VIEWS ON CURRENT STATUS OF CANADIAN-INDIAN RELATIONS IN NUCLEAR FIELD WITHOUT, HOWEVER, DRAWING ON REFTELS. SISCO

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